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The focus of  this fascinating collection of  essays by Edoardo Tortarolo is an 
examination of  the lines of  German-Italian intercultural relations in the eighteenth 
century. A stated aim of  the collection is to investigate individuals who were 
historically significant in this context, but who have been largely sidelined in recent 
research. The reader is presented with a series of  six essays, each one focussing on a 
key thinker and the contemporary thinkers and debates to which he was connected 
and with whom and with which he engaged. One drawback of  this book is the 
general lack of  connective tissue in the introduction. Indeed, a greater discussion 
concerning the detailed conceptual links between the historical episodes and 
personalities discussed in the essays contained within the collection would have 
helped to better anchor some of  its key themes. A fuller introduction would also 
have rendered this intriguing and important collection somewhat more accessible to a 
wider scholarly audience, including early advanced undergraduates. Unfortunately, the 
introduction does not really develop a detailed conceptual framework or chapter 
overview, and one of  its aims - to provide food for thought concerning modern 
intercultural relations in Europe - is weakly stated at best. On the other hand, the 
beauty of  this collection of  essays is that it offers the scholar a treasure chest of  
generally heterogeneous, yet interrelated parts, as well as the intellectual “breathing 
room” to engage with the research findings and analysis free of  stifling and 
prescriptive paradigms.  
 
The first chapter in this collection examines the relationship between the 
Italian painter and printmaker Giovanni Battista Casanova (brother of  the better 
known Casanova) and Johann Winckelmann. This relationship began when Casanova 
was in Rome from 1752-62 in the circle of  Raphael Mengs. Casanova was involved in 
reproductions of  the frescoes of  Pompeii and Herculaneum, and this was how he 
came into contact with Winckelmann (11), finishing the sketches for the engraving in 
Winckelmann’s Monumenti inediti. After Casanova was called back to Dresden by 
Hagedorn to teach in the newly revived Academy of  Arts, the friendship between he 
and Winckelmann disintegrated. The focus of  this chapter is on the intellectual 
dimensions of  the dispute between Casanova and Winckelmann. Tortarolo argues 
that, essentially, this concerned the nexus between aesthetics and historicity, and that 
it was at the centre of  a much larger polemic against Winckelmann. Utilizing the 
German edition of  Casanova’s 1770 work Abhandlung über verschiedene alte Denkmäler 
der Kunst, Tortarolo maintains that its apparent didactic function belies its significance 
for understanding the nature of  the conflict. He argues that Casanova’s work, 
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contextualized by way of  reference to Mengs’ earlier study, Gedanken über die Schönheit 
und über den Geschmak in der Malerey (sic), can be read as a challenge to the perceived 
rigidity and ahistoricity of  a theory-driven, “systematic” approach to art-historical 
analysis and aesthetics; an approach, as Casanova perceived it, of  which 
Winckelmann was a proponent. In place of  such a system, Casanova espoused a 
relativistic aesthetics, as well as the vital necessity of  historical knowledge and, most 
importantly, practical experience (including the capacity to draw) for the discernment 
of  authenticity in antique art. The focus of  any art-historical analysis had to situate a 
work of  art within its correct and concrete cultural-historical context, and this 
required a strong familiarity with not only historical knowledge, but also the artwork 
itself. One outgrowth of  Casanova’s approach was an attack on a hegemonic 
aesthetics centred around Greco-Roman art (exemplified by Winckelmann), as seen 
in his elevation of  the importance of  Egyptian art for later (Greek) developments, 
and in his exclamation that “every style has its own beauty” (28). 
 
The second chapter in this collection examines the German translation of  the 
Florentine political philosopher Cosimo Amidei’s La Chiesa e la repubblica dentro i loro 
limiti (1768) by the one-time courtier in Vienna and writer Franz Rudolph von 
Grossing in 1784. The German title of  the text is Die Kirche und der Staat, ihre 
beyderseitige Pflicht, Macht und Gränzen (sic). The focus of  Tortarolo’s analysis is the 
manner in which Grossing not only translated but also modified Amidei’s text in 
order to utilize it as part of  his anti-clerical and, ultimately, anti-absolutist polemic 
during the time of  the Josephinian reforms in the Habsburg Monarchy. Indeed, this 
essay is especially germane to the core themes of  the collection, as it indicates the 
potential for recontextualization of  texts in the service of  far more radical ideas in 
the eighteenth century. Having initially supported absolutism in his text Der Souverain, 
oder die ersten Haupt- und Grundsätze einer Monarchischen Regierung (1780), in the following 
years Grossing came to retract this sentiment in favour of  one that perceived 
despotism as intrinsically bound with “religious oppression”. Grossing likely 
encountered Amidei’s (anonymous) work during his 1773 trip to Italy, after which he 
appropriated and added different lines of  argumentation to it. One such component 
that Grossing added to the text was a particular emphasis on religious reform. Indeed, 
as Tortarolo shows, from the first chapter Grossing inserted a discussion of  the 
psychological basis of  Christian religion, as he saw it. All-too-human emotions, such 
as fear, gave rise to religion “as a clerical power system”, in which the clerical 
institutions were themselves the product of  superstition. The “true” Christianity was 
based on reason, according to Grossing, and it was one in which there was no need 
for priests “because every person is his own priest”. While building upon Amidei’s 
separation of  temporal and spiritual power, Grossing ultimately radicalized it when 
he argued that ecclesiastical authority ultimately rested with God alone. While 
Grossing’s translation and expansion of  Amidei’s work charges the text with a 
resolute anti-Catholic, anti-clerical tone, it also (as the title suggests) examines the 
limits of  temporal authority. Indeed, Grossing articulates Amidei’s discussion of  
Rousseau’s social contract theory and connects it to anti-clerical polemic. Tortarolo 
argues that Grossing, building upon Amidei’s discussion of  Rousseau, saw the 
human capacity for “docility” while in a state of  bondage as the root cause of  both 
despotism and the ability of  the church to appropriate various powers that should 
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utilization of  human reason and social and political awareness on the part of  the 
body politic; an awareness of  their own rights, and the ability to see the powers of  
church and state in a new light. Grossing expanded on Amidei’s discussion of  the 
nature of  the sovereign, emphasizing the first-among-equals status of  this figure and 
linking sovereignty to the exercise of  the general, rather than particular will. The 
right to religious freedom was a key liberty that the state was obliged, on account of  
the derived nature of  its power, to uphold, and the difference between a sovereign 
and a tyrant could be seen in whether such a right was protected by the state or 
abrogated in favour of  the right of  the Roman Curia to control religious affairs. 
 
Chapter three is especially salient for German Enlightenment studies, as it 
begins from the premise that we should (and, indeed, have begun to) consider the 
philosophical bases of  the German Enlightenment to extend far beyond the twin 
pillars of  Idealism and Weimar Classicism. Indeed, as Tortarolo argues, widening the 
scholarly horizon to include other intellectual movements, such as Popularphilosophie, 
reveals the diversity of  German intellectual life in the eighteenth century. The focus 
of  Tortarolo’s analysis in this chapter is the history of  philosophy, and the place 
within this of  universal history, exemplified by Karl Friedrich Flögel, and its 
alacritous uptake in Italian discourse in the second half  of  the eighteenth century. 
Tortarolo begins by noting the general paucity of  German philosophical texts in Italy 
in the first three-quarters of  the eighteenth century. However, in the last decades of  
this century, there was a flurry of  translations of  German texts pertaining to 
Popularphilosophie, such as those by the then-reputed, but now little known Karl 
Friedrich Flögel. The popularity of  Flögel’s work, as well as others of  the 
Popularphilosophie such as Sulzer, Mendelssohn and Sonnenfels was not chiefly 
attributable to the influences of  Italian publishers and translators, Tortarolo argues, 
but was in large measure on account of  its capacity to provide “a consensus-forming 
model of  interpretation of  universal history, which linked anthropological optimism, 
reform pragmatism and political loyalty” (72). The intellectual climate in history of  
philosophy at that time in the German lands, and that in which we can situate 
Flögel’s ideas, concerned the desire to construct a “rational interpretation of  human 
history without the need for a regression to the concepts of  chance and wonder” 
(61). Flögel’s text, Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes, appeared after that of  Isaak 
Iselin, Über die Geschichte der Menschheit (1764), with which it shared a certain affinity. 
Indeed, Iselin’s text maintained that the progress of  a society was to be measured by 
the “degree of  control of  reason over sensuality and imagination” that it possessed, 
and it was the common endeavour to connect “the empirical diversity of  historical 
contingencies and the unitary development of  reason” (62) that linked Flögel’s 
intellectual programme to that of  Iselin. Flögel’s text was then later translated into 
Italian by the professor of  German languages and literature at Padua, Angelo Ridolfi. 
 
In chapter four, Tortarolo investigates and contextualizes the thought of  
Giovanni Salvemini di Castiglione, a Tuscan-born, Calvinist convert and philosopher 
of  natural law who resided for a period of  time in Vevey, Lausanne and Bern. The 
focus of  the chapter is Salvemini’s critique of  Rousseau’s second Discours. Salvemini 
directed his confutation of  Rousseau at the latter’s attack on a fundamental principle 
of  natural law: that man is an inherently social creature, and that private property has 
a socially stabilizing effect. Salvemini begins by arguing against Rousseau’s 
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conception of  the state of  nature and the natural condition of  humanity. In place of  
Rousseau’s individualist, pre-societal Golden Age, Salvemini argues that “natural man” 
exists not outside of  society, but within it, embedded within patriarchal and 
paternalist familial structures. As Tortarolo states, Salvemini perceived society not as 
“the root of  all evil, rather as the necessary prerequisite of  human perfection” (87). 
Responding further to Rousseau’s text, Salvemini maintained that the socio-economic 
inequality that exists in society, while a product of  private property, nonetheless also 
contains the seeds of  its own amelioration, as it is through economic development 
that a society as a whole becomes wealthier and thus has the capacity to build 
institutions that promote the common good. Salvemini was not just a “liberal 
Protestant writer”, an idea developed in the context of  the nineteenth century and 
projected back onto the eighteenth, contends Tortarolo. Rather, Salvemini was very 
much at the vanguard of  a natural-law-based, moderate, antidespotic (yet not 
antimonarchist) Enlightenment movement. It was neither radical nor conservative; 
indeed, Salvemini saw his ideas not as an alternative to these aspects of  
Enlightenment thought, but rather situated them as the “single possible” 
Enlightenment philosophy. 
 
Chapter five investigates the political influences upon, and political 
dimensions of, the Berlin Academy of  Sciences, initially the personal project of  the 
polymath Leibniz. Tortarolo’s discussion centres upon the Berlin Academy’s 
existence within the context of  the reign of  Friedrich II, examining its role (from the 
1740s) as an instrument of  knowledge production in the service of  Prussian 
absolutist politics. While the Academy could prove to be an unwieldy instrument 
(indeed, the intellectual undercurrents and heterogeneous influences permeating it 
were many and various), nonetheless its members did share a commitment to 
enlightened absolutism, especially to historical scholarship in support of  it. Situated 
firmly within contemporary European discussions concerning the nature of  
historical knowledge and political philosophy, one encounters within the Academy 
figures such as Jakob Wegelin and Carlo Denina. While this chapter does provide an 
interesting view into some of  the political dynamics of  the Berlin Academy, it is, 
unfortunately, not the strongest chapter in the collection. It would be of  benefit to 
the reader, and to the coherence of  the chapter, if  the thesis could be established 
much sooner, and this in a less circuitous manner. Indeed, it isn’t until the final pages 
of  the chapter that Carlo Denina, ostensibly an integral part of  the analysis according 
to the title of  the chapter, is really introduced.  
 
The aim of  chapter six is not to provide a revision of  Alberto Radicati di 
Passerano’s life and work, but rather to situate him within radical Enlightenment 
discourses. Tortarolo argues that the radical Radicati should not be thought of  as an 
isolated figure, but rather that it is important to link him to other thinkers who 
shared common intellectual concerns, especially regarding deist discourse in early 
eighteenth-century London. This chapter carries out such a maneuver by 
contextualizing Radicati through a discussion of  the equally controversial Johann 
Conrad von Hatzfeld. Indeed, the primary focus of  the chapter is on Hatzfeld’s 
radical thought, beginning with his attack on the relationship between godly 
influence and Newtonian mechanism in his The Case of  the Learned According to the 
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potentially interventionist God, ready to step in and rectify the cosmic equilibrium, as 
one step on a slippery slope toward Spinozean pantheism. Against what he perceived 
as the pernicious occasionalism inherent in Newtonian (and Cartesian) thought, and 
in support of  his deist views, Hatzfeld advocated a materialist dynamic system in 
which matter itself  possessed the property of  movement and the force of  attraction. 
A particular point of  synergy between Hatzfeld and Radicati came in Radicati’s 
defence of  suicide, A Philosophical Dissertation Upon Death (1732), which drew heavily 
on John Toland’s use of  materialist dynamism in his Letters to Serena (1704), and 
would later influence Hatzfeld’s own views on the matter. Tortarolo indicates that it 
would be incorrect to associate Hatzfeld with conservative, Tory and 
High-Church-aligned opponents of  Newton, such as Robert Greene, as Hatzfeld 
also held strongly socially critical and republican views. This was indeed what set 
Hatzfeld apart from Newton’s usual critics in the British Isles. Further afield in the 
Netherlands, having departed London in 1741, Hatzfeld’s next incendiary publication, 
La decouverte de la verité et le monde detrompé (1745), provoked the opprobrium of  the 
municipal magistrate in the Hague. This was on account of  its manifestly anti-clerical, 
even “anti-religious” agenda (129). While the text continued its polemic against 
Newton, it also revealed a strong political, social and intellectual reform motif. 
Indeed, as Tortarolo states, such criticism was “tightly bound with his criticism of  the 
philosophical bases of  modernity” (130). In many respects, while Hatzfeld attempted 
to integrate himself  into contemporary debates, the radicalism of  his views 
precluded any substantial support by leading lights of  the Enlightenment, such as 
Christian Wolff. 
 
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, this collection of  essays 
emphasizes the importance of  human agency in historical transformation. Indeed, 
this book comprises a stimulating bricolage of  histories which probes different and 
diverse facets of  various intellectual debates in the Enlightenment. It articulates the 
myriad dimensions of, and discourses feeding into, learned thought in the eighteenth 
century, and in so doing, ultimately asks us to return to the hoary chestnut, “Was ist 
Aufklärung?”. However, it does this (in refreshingly understated fashion) not through 
the prosaic and abstract, but through the personal and the particular. Consensus has 
formed around the notion that there was not one single Enlightenment, but that 
there were many, and this collection, far from any structuralist pretensions, brings to 
the fore those actors who contributed to and shaped these historical developments. 
